For many years I’ve wanted to publish this roughly 3,000-word paper that I wrote in seminary for my Apologetics class under Dr. Ron Nash, who praised my work on the topic. I’ve decided to share it with you this week in its entirety, and I hope you find it helpful.
“The most impressive argument of natural atheology has to do with the problem of evil.”1 Indeed, to many people, the existence of apparently meaningless evil forms their single greatest challenge to Christian faith. This problem has both a theoretical and psychological side. In this paper I will attempt to demonstrate that there is ample evidence to provide psychological confidence that no gratuitous evil exists.
David Hume framed the problem when he wrote, “Epicurus’s old questions are yet unanswered. Is he will to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? The he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” 2
The deductive problem of evil states that belief in God is logically inconsistent if we say that God exists, that He created the world, that He is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good, and that the world contains evil (the theistic set). 3 If this formulation was found true, then either God doesn’t know how to eliminate evil, He doesn’t care, or He can’t do anything about it.
This problem has been successfully and forever resolved by Alvin Plantinga, who began by asking simply, “Where is the contradiction?” in what he calls “the theistic set.” No contradiction exists. Plantinga allowed that the atheologian could argue for an implicit rather than an explicit contradiction. However, to make their case the atheologian must produce another proposition that, when added to the theistic set, creates a contradiction. No atheologian has been able to produce such a proposition that is both true and essential to Christian belief.
Instead, as an offensive move, Plantinga has provided a logically possible premise that forever resolves the problem of deductive evil—namely, that God created a world containing evil and He had a good reason for doing so. 4 Furthermore, Plantinga has provided his well-known free will defense as a possible reason why God would have created such a world. 5
The inductive problem of evil claims that the existence of evil leads to the conclusion that the existence of God is probably false. 6 This approach has been answered by the premise that God permits evil only to the extent that it brings about a greater good or prevents a greater evil (the doctrine of meticulous providence). The principle is that the only evil that occurs is actually necessary to bring about a greater good or prevent a greater evil. Three specific explanations are provided by the free will theodicy, the natural law theodicy, and the soul making theodicy. These are extremely important arguments regarding the proposed problem of gratuitous evil. They demonstrate that God apparently has some good reasons for creating a world that contains evil.
Even though the deductive problem of evil has been forever eliminated through the arguments presented by Plantinga, and even though there are weighty arguments to address the inductive problem of evil, there remains the problem of what appears to be meaningless evil and suffering. The key word here is “appears.”
If the atheologian can prove that there is evil in the world that does not bring about a greater good or prevent a greater evil, then the basis for belief in the Christian God would be overturned.
To any observer it must certainly appear that there are many instances of apparently meaningless, senseless evil and suffering.
A young man swerves to miss an oncoming car, slams into a tree, and spends the rest of his life in a wheelchair. A young woman in debt learns her spending sprees are linked to the manic-depressive disorder with which she must learn to cope. Daily migraine headaches prompt a man to squirrel pain pills in his coat pockets, glove compartment, desk, and briefcase, as well as keeping a stockpile at home.
Tragedies strike at seeming random and without respect. A middle-aged man dies suddenly of a heart attack, leaving a wife and three school-aged children alone in the world. A retired man loses most of his capital in the Black Monday stock market crash and must go back to work.
Perhaps the most difficult to accept and most distressing of all the effects of the Fall are those tragedies that sort of just happen. A father took his eighteen-year-old son on his very first hunting trip and then accidentally killed him with a shotgun blast after mistaking him for a deer. In utter despair, the father then killed himself with the same gun. How can such tragedies be explained? 7
Deductively, the atheologian has not been able to produce a set of propositions that proves there is gratuitous evil. Now the challenge is directed evidentially. William Rowe states it this way:Some philosophers have contended that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God. No one, I think, has succeeded in establishing such an extravagant claim. Indeed, granted incompatibilism, there is a fairly compelling argument for the view that the existence of evil is logically consistent with the existence of the theistic God. . . . There remains, however, what we may call the evidential form — as opposed to the logical form — of the problem of evil: the view that the variety and profusion of evil in our world, although perhaps not logically inconsistent with the existence of the theistic God, provides, nevertheless, rational support for atheism. 8 Rowe has presented an interesting formulation of the inductive problem of gratuitous evil:
Taking human and animal suffering as a clear instance of evil which occurs with great frequency in our world, the argument for atheism based on evil can be stated as follows:
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being. 9
This argument is valid, but do we have rational grounds to accept it as true? It is just as valid for the theist to say, by Rowe’s own admission, that because there exists an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good being, there do not exist any instances of evil or suffering that could have been prevented without losing a greater good or preventing a greater evil. Who has the burden of proof between these two formulations?
R. C. Sproul and John Gerstner say:It must be proven that evil in general has no purpose or that particular evils have no purpose. If it is even hypothetically possible that there is a moral God who is displeased with the behavior of persons in the world, we cannot conclude that He could not and, indeed, should not display His displeasure in symbols of wrath which we call evil. Again, if there is immoral behavior in this world, it would be the absence of evil and suffering which would be the cause for questioning purpose in the world.” 10
Neither the atheologian or the theist can prove with rational certainty that their argument is true. Therefore, we have a draw at the theoretical level. Nevertheless, it seems that the party attacking theistic belief has the burden of proof.
However, I believe that the psychological factors surrounding the problem of apparently meaningless evil and suffering demand that we go further than merely declaring a draw. People are asking, “Why do bad things happen to good people?” Rowe makes his strongest argument when he says:
That none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting a greater evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond belief. It seems that although we cannot prove that [his first proposition above] is true, it is, nevertheless, altogether reasonable to believe that [his first proposition above] is true, that [it] is a rational belief. 11
While logically the atheologian may not have a better case against the existence of God because of apparently gratuitous evil, he/she does have a psychological advantage. It is incumbent upon the theist to provide psychologically satisfying explanations for seemingly gratuitous evil even if proofs cannot be offered. While rational certainty cannot be provided, it is important to provide as much explanation and defense as possible to build a body of evidence that can satisfy the sincere inquirer with enough “possibly true” psychological evidence to quell the arguments of the atheologian. Where can we turn for help? Not to William Hasker or Michael Peterson.
Hasker and Peterson have gone too far in trying to accommodate apparently gratuitous evil. Hasker wants to build on Peterson to say God must permit certain kinds of gratuitous evil, saying, “There is a certain intuitive plausibility in the notion that a morally perfect God would not permit any gratuitous evil.” But from there he goes on to say that morally significant free choices would be undermined if God was always able to prevent gratuitous evil. Hasker concludes:
[God] cannot be morally required to prevent gratuitous natural evil. For such a theist, then, gratuitous evil, whether natural or moral, in no way conflicts with the goodness and perfection of God. 12
Hasker has clearly gone too far. He is willing to sacrifice the sovereignty of God on the altar of compromise. He willingly gives up our hope that God is who the Scriptures declare Him to be so that God will coincide with the appearances of His (and our) experience. In Hasker’s footnotes we find a clue to his possible motivations. There he thanks William Rowe for his help reviewing his article and suggesting changes. I should rather think it is Mr. Rowe who thanks Mr. Hasker, for he has acted as his agent.
I would suggest a different approach, which denies gratuitous evil. It is not insignificant that there are no instances of meaningless evil and suffering in the Bible. The theist does not interpret his Bible based upon his experience but rather interprets his experience based upon his Bible. The atheologian cannot appeal to the worldview of the theist for help, because the Bible provides a plethora of different reasons for suffering. Psychologically, there is comfort in suffering because there is purpose to suffering. Let’s examine three points.
First, the Bible makes clear the point that in this world everyone will suffer. Admitting that evil exists does no harm, for theistic belief declares it to be part of life. From Genesis to Revelation, from creation to the present, the Bible is a book that describes a great cosmic struggle between the forces of good and the forces of evil, culminating in human suffering. The prophets suffered, Jesus suffered, the disciples suffered, and we suffer. The atheist cannot appeal to the presence of suffering and evil as a contradiction to the Christian worldview.
Jesus said, “I have told you these things, so that in me you may have peace. In this world you will have trouble. But take heart! I have overcome the world” (John 16:33). “We must go through many hardships to enter the kingdom of God” (Acts 14:22b). ”Dear friends, do not be surprised at the painful trial you are suffering, as though something strange were happening to you” (1 Peter 4:12).
Second, the Bible says that, rather than being a pointless exercise, there is purpose to suffering. The doctrine of meticulous providence states that no evils are allowed unless they produce a greater good or prevent a greater evil. People can handle almost any amount of evil and suffering if they believe it is for a purpose. Countless are the stories of men who have suffered great financial, family, and/or health losses, only to express gratitude for God’s intervention to deliver them from bondage to sin.
Some of the purposes for evil and suffering, which produce greater goods or prevent greater evils, include:
1) so that we will not rely upon ourselves but upon God (see 2 Corinthians 1:9),
2) so that God may receive praise (see 1 Peter 1:6-7),
3) so that evil may be punished (see Deuteronomy 9:4-5),
4) so that we may draw closer to God (see 2 Corinthians 1:4),
5) so that our character may be developed (see Romans 5:3-5),
6) so that we may be delivered from bondage to decay and become children of God (see Romans 8:20-21), and
7) so that we may be made more sensitive to others so that we can comfort them with the comfort we ourselves have received (see 2 Corinthians 1:4 and Luke 22:31-33).
Additional purposes include to preserve our free will, to allow for Christian growth, and to bring about correction and discipline. Apologist J. P. Moreland says, “Many theists hold that God could not make free creatures who could not sin, for that would be to make free creatures who were not free. Evil is traceable to the free will of God’s creatures. So evil is not evidence of a limit to God’s power any more than his inability to make a square circle limits his power.” 13
These arguments are typically set up as theodicies based upon free will, natural law, and soul making.
Third, not only is there purpose to suffering, but also there is no meaningless suffering. That people suffer for no apparent reason does not mean that there is no reason. Two Bible texts support this claim.
Romans 8:28 says, “And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose.” The clear meaning of this verse is that whatever befalls the believer, it works for their good (whether in this life or only eternally we cannot be certain). This, of course doesn’t take care of the possibility of gratuitous evil for the wicked. However, if the wicked are wicked, then they deserve punishments. The only question that remains is whether or not those punishments are just. The Christian God is just and therefore no evil befalls the wicked without purpose or fairness. “The wicked have their fill of trouble” (Proverbs 12:21b).
Proverbs 12:21 in its entirety says, “No harm befalls the righteous, but the wicked have their fill of trouble.” The word for “harm” is translated as “evil” in the KJV. The Hebrew word means “to come to naught or nothingness.” 14 Said differently, nothing that happens to the righteous will come to naught or amount to nothing; suffering is not meaningless.
Because the Bible says that people will suffer and that such evils have purpose and are not meaningless, there is great comfort and even joy for the believer. While Jesus said that in this world we will have trouble, He also said, “But take heart! I have overcome the world” (John 16:33). “Therefore we do not lose heart. Though outwardly we are wasting away, yet inwardly we are being renewed day by day. For our light and momentary troubles are achieving for us an eternal glory that far outweighs them all” (2 Corinthians 4:16-17). Not only this but also, “We rejoice in the hope of the glory of God. Not only so, but we also rejoice in our sufferings” (Romans 5:2b-3a).
This explanation goes a long way to provide psychological confidence to persons concerned about the presence of apparently meaningless evil and suffering. We may not be able to attain logical certainty, but we can attain psychological certainty.
What is the evidence for and against the existence of gratuitous evil? I have shown a brief history of both the deductive and inductive arguments against theistic belief because of evil and apparently gratuitous evil.
Let’s think about and feel the weight of the evidence. Inductively, atheists cannot prove that greater goods do not exist. Neither can theists prove they do exist, but theists can point to numerous possible reasons.
While experience strongly suggests that pointless evils exist, Christian belief is based upon the Bible, which declares there are no acts of meaningless evil. In fact, the Bible declares numerous possible and actual reasons for suffering.
Our strongest inductive arguments against gratuitous evil are religious experience, the didactic teachings of the Bible, and the historical experiences recorded in the Bible. That the existence of evil cannot be made to prove that belief in the theistic God is logically inconsistent is a profound argument against gratuitous evil.
The combined strength of two arguments is persuasive and forms strong support against gratuitous evil and for belief in God: First, that inductively theists have a strong case to support the idea that no gratuitous evil exists and, second, that deductively theists have removed the problem of evil altogether.
God always has a reason for allowing evil. Even if we stop here and admit we don’t know the reasons why, what follows is of “very little interest,” as Plantinga puts it. “Why suppose if God does have good reason for permitting evil, theists would be the first to know? Perhaps God has a good reason, but that reason is too complicated to understand. Or perhaps he has not revealed it for some reason.” 15
Moses states it this way: “The secret things belong to the LORD our God” (Deuteronomy 29:29a).
Even Rowe concedes, “To say no greater good exists would require omniscience on our part.” 16
Can the atheologian prove any unjustified evil? No. Can he offer any probable reasons for unjustified evil? No. All he can say is that it appears to be meaningless, but he cannot say why.
When the confluence of all arguments for the existence of theistic God are considered—cosmological, teleological, religious experience—it seems more reasonable to conclude that these evils that appear pointless do, in fact, have a point, especially when viewed in perspective of the biblical record. We can have psychological certainty that no gratuitous evil exists.
Much love,
Pat
1 Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), 115.
2 David Hume, God and the Problem of Evil (from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion), Rowe, William L. and Wainwright, William J., editors, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1973), 187.
3 Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, Zondervan Publishing House,1988), 181.
4 Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdman’s, 1974), 26. Dr. Nash: This book, though on reserve, was not in the library on three separate occasions. I have obtained this material from your book, Faith and Reason.
5 Ibid, 30.
6 Nash, 195.
7 Patrick M. Morley, The Rest of Your Life (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, Publishers, Inc. 1992), 147.
8 William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 16, October 1979, 335.
9 Ibid, 335.
10 R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsley, Classical Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), 135.
11 Rowe, 338.
12 William Hasker, “The Necessity of Gratuitous Evil,” Faith and Philosophy, Volume 9, January 1992, 24-40.
13 J.P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, Baker Book House, 1987), 66.
14 Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance.
15 Nash, quoting Plantinga in God, Freedom, and Evil.
16 Rowe, 337.
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